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abstract: Sperm competition theory has largely focused on the
evolution of ejaculate expenditure strategies across different species
or populations or across discrete mating roles on which sperm com-
petition operates differentially. Few studies have considered the extent
to which male ejaculate expenditure is influenced by continuous
change in male phenotype within a population. Here we model how
optimal ejaculate expenditure responds to two sources of continuous
variation: (1) the quantity of resources allocated by a male to mating
within a breeding season and (2) the resource cost of obtaining a
mate. We find that variation in the amount of resources available
for mating does not alone produce selection for differing ejaculate
investment strategies. However, when there is variation in the cost
of obtaining a mate, males with a lower cost will be selected to invest
fewer sperm per mating than males whose cost is higher. Any pa-
rameter decreasing this cost will also select for decreased ejaculate
investment per mating. These results provide a novel insight into
the evolution of male ejaculate expenditure strategies, revealing that
individual constraints on the ability to secure matings can lead to
variation in ejaculate expenditure even when the risk of sperm com-
petition is the same for all males.
Keywords: sperm competition, sexual selection, ornaments, fertility.
Introduction
In many species, females mate multiply and the ejaculates
of different males compete to fertilize a set of eggs, a
process called sperm competition (Parker 1970; Pizzari and
Parker 2009). A key determinant of the outcome of sperm
competition is the relative number of sperm delivered by
competing ejaculates (Martin et al. 1974; Wedell et al.
2002; Gage and Morrow 2003), generating postinsemi-
nation sexual selection on male investment in the number
of sperm inseminated (ejaculate expenditure). Sperm com-
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petition theory has traditionally modeled strategies of ejac-
ulate expenditure in a species or population as the response
to the average degree of sperm competition faced by an
ejaculate (Parker 1990a, 1998; Parker et al. 1996; Wedell
et al. 2002). This view has been challenged by recent studies
(Parker and Ball 2005; Williams et al. 2005) that propose
a more dynamic alternative in which optimal ejaculate
expenditure and the degree of sperm competition coevolve
within a population, each having an effect on the other.
This interdependence arises because as the optimal ejac-
ulate expenditure increases, the expected number of mat-
ings per male decreases. Therefore, the expected number
of matings per female will also decrease and with it the
degree of sperm competition that an ejaculate is expected
to face. It is this feedback that determines the evolutionary
outcome.
Models of sperm competition have generally assumed
that differences between males within a species or popu-
lation are negligible compared to those between species or
populations. Where variation within species or popula-
tions has been investigated, the male population has been
split into discrete reproductive strategies that bias the level
of sperm competition faced by the ejaculates of different
males, bias the information males have on the level of
sperm competition associated with a copulation, or “load”
the sperm competition raffle between the ejaculates of
males mating with the same female in different roles (Par-
ker 1990a, 1990b; Mesterton-Gibbons 1999a, 1999b; Ball
and Parker 2000). These studies predict that each male
reproductive strategy, or role, will have a corresponding
discrete optimal ejaculate expenditure strategy. However,
much phenotypic variation among males is likely to be
continuous because of, for example, variable access to re-
sources, female mate choice, environmental or genetic fac-
tors, and differences in age or phenotype. Despite its bi-
ological generality, the potential effect of continuous,
within-population variation on ejaculate expenditure has
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not been explicitly modeled. In this article, we provide a
starting point for an analysis of such effects.
We adapt the alternative theoretical model for ejaculate
expenditure (Williams et al. 2005) to include within-pop-
ulation variation, and we consider two candidate contin-
uously varying traits. First, the quantity of resources al-
located to reproduction (R) may vary continuously across
a population of males. Some males may be able to obtain
more resources overall and thus have proportionately
more for reproduction. Alternatively, males may allocate
resources differently in each breeding season throughout
their lifetime (e.g., yearlings vs. mature adults; Pianka and
Parker 1975). In either case, the quantity of resources avail-
able for reproductive effort in a given breeding season will
differ from male to male, and we expect this to vary in a
continuous manner.
Second, males may differ in the resource cost (c), that
is, the time and energy they spend seeking out and courting
a female in order to obtain a mating. One mechanism that
could result in such variation is female mate choice. For
example, if females display preference toward certain male
phenotypic traits, a male will pay progressively less to mate
as his phenotype approaches that preferred by females
(Andersson 1994; Andersson and Iwasa 1996). Similarly,
males may vary continuously in their competitive ability
to gain access to females. In this case, a male with a higher
c value must work harder to secure a mating than one
with a lower c value. Again, we expect that this cost will
vary continuously across a population. Note that the
amount of resources a male puts into the growth and
maintenance of a secondary sexual ornament or a position
in a social hierarchy in order to attract females is a cost
distinct from that being modeled here. For the purposes
of this article, the cost a male pays to attract a female is
simply a measure of the mean amount of effort he has to
expend to attract each mate in a given breeding season.
This may be related to a male’s investment in attractiveness
or competitive ability, but the cost of this initial investment
is assumed to have been paid before the breeding season
begins. Thus, all males arrive in our model at the start of
the breeding season with their c and R values already in
place. We do, however, allow for the possibility that these
parameters are not independent.
The Model
Let R be the quantity of resources allocated by a male to
reproduction in a given mating season. Suppose that it
costs a male c units of resource to obtain a mate and that
for every mating a further s units of resource are used for
the production of sperm. For simplicity, we assume that
a male’s ejaculate expenditure is the same for every mating
in a breeding season (the validity of this assumption is
considered in “Discussion”). The total cost per mating is
therefore . A male playing a strategy s then has anc s
expected number of matings n(s), where
R
n(s)p .
c s
In order to calculate the relative fitness of aˆW(s, s)
mutant strategy s against a population of males all playing
strategy , we calculate its expected reproductive successsˆ
per mating. Then the expected reproductive successˆn(s, s)
is
ˆ ˆW(s, s)p n(s)n(s, s), (1)
the product of the expected number of matings and the
expected success per mating (Parker 1998; see also Mes-
terton-Gibbons 1999a, 1999b and Ball and Parker 2000
for discussions of alternative additive models).
To calculate , we assume that sperm competitionˆn(s, s)
is a fair raffle (Parker 1982, 1990a, 1990b, 1998) and that
the “fertilizing power” of the sperm produced by a male
is linearly proportional to the resource expenditure s that
the male invests in producing the sperm. Thus, putting
twice as many resources into an ejaculate is assumed to
double its competitive efficiency, perhaps because there
are twice as many sperm in the ejaculate (we consider the
generality of this assumption in “Discussion”). The ex-
pected reproductive success of a mutant male playing strat-
egy s from mating with a female who also mates with k
wild-type males playing strategy will simply be the pro-sˆ
portion of his sperm inseminated in the female, s/(s
.ˆks)
We now need to know the probability pk that a female
who mates with a focal male will have mated with k ad-
ditional males in the breeding season. In a large population
with unitary sex ratio, random mating, and a negligible
chance that any male will mate with the same female twice,
this probability is given by the Poisson distribution
ˆk nnˆ e
p p , (2)k k!
where is the expected number of matings achieved bynˆ
a male playing strategy .1 Therefore, the expected repro-sˆ
ductive success of a male playing strategy s againstˆn(s, s)
a population playing strategy issˆ
1 Note that Williams et al. (2005) use the probability qk that a male mates
with a female who mates with other males, for . Thus,k 1 kp 1, 2, 3, …
their qk is the same as our .pk1
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
s
ˆn(s, s)p p . (3) k
ˆs kskp0
We now adopt an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
approach (Maynard Smith 1974, 1982). We look for an
ESS s∗ that is a strict best reply to itself. In other words,
against a population of males playing strategy s∗, any mu-
tant male playing an alternative strategy will have∗s( s
strictly lower fitness than the wild type playing s∗. Math-
ematically, this states that for any∗ ∗ ∗W(s , s ) 1 W(s, s )
. Note that, usually, an ESS s∗ requires the weaker∗s( s
condition that for any and that∗ ∗ ∗ ∗W(s , s ) ≥ W(s, s ) s( s
for any mutant strategy s such that ∗ ∗ ∗W(s , s )p W(s, s )
we also have . However, here there will∗W(s , s) 1 W(s, s)
be no alternative best replies, since we show in appendix
A that , and so the ESS is a nondegenerate2 2( W/s )F ! 0∗sps
maximum (cf. Williams et al. 2005).
Variation in Resources and Costs
We assume a fixed distribution of resource allocation R
and cost c over the population of males. A male with
resources R and cost c (referred to as an (R, c) male)
follows ejaculate investment strategy s(R, c) and has a cor-
responding expected number of matings n(R, c):
R
n(R, c)p . (4)
c s(R, c)
We denote the population mean values for ejaculate in-
vestment and expected number of matings by and ,¯ ¯s n
respectively. If an (R, c) male plays strategy s against a
population of males with mean strategy and mean num-s¯
ber of matings , his fitness is then calcu-¯ ¯ ¯n W(R, c, sFs, n)
lated by substituting equations (2)–(4) into equation (1),
giving
 ¯k n¯R n e s
¯ ¯W(R, c, sFs, n)p . (5)
¯c s k! s kskp0
We wish to find the ESS ejaculate expenditure s∗ for the
population as a function of R and c. This is the strategy
s∗(R, c), such that for any pair R and c and any s(
,∗s (R, c)
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗¯ ¯ ¯ ¯W(R, c, sFs , n ) ! W(R, c, s (R, c)Fs , n ),
so an (R, c) male in a heterogeneous male population
whose ejaculate expenditure is determined by the function
s∗ can lower his fitness only by using a strategy other than
s∗(R, c) (see app. A for proof that the ESS is a nondegen-
erate maximum and thus that there can be no alternative
best reply).
Risk and Intensity of Competition
In some previous theoretical work (Parker 1998), the ejac-
ulate expenditure strategy of a male has been expected to
vary with the risk or intensity of sperm competition. Here
we follow Williams et al. (2005) and define the risk of
competition for a focal ejaculate as the probability that
sperm competition occurs ( at the ESS, since
∗¯n1 e
is the probability that a female receives no other mat-
∗¯ne
ings) and the intensity of competition as the number of
ejaculates expected to compete for paternity of a given
female’s offspring ( at the ESS). By these definitions, all∗n¯
males face the same risk and intensity of sperm compe-
tition. Any differences in optimal ejaculate expenditure
strategy will therefore not be due to the risk or intensity
differences outlined in classical models.
Results
Analysis
An ESS for an (R, c) male with quantity of resources R
and cost of obtaining a mate c will be a solution of the
equation
W ∗ ∗¯ ¯(R, c, sFs , n )p 0.
s
Assuming that such an ESS exists,2 we differentiate equa-
tion (5) with respect to s at and , to obtain∗ ∗¯ ¯ ¯ ¯sp s np n
∗ ¯∗ k n¯W Rc (n ) e 1∗ ∗¯ ¯(R, c, sFs , n )p 2 ∗¯s (c s) k! s kskp0
∗ ¯∗ k n¯Rs (n ) e 1
  ∗ 2¯(c s) k! (s ks )kp0
p 0,
which implies that
2 It can be shown analytically that such an ESS exists under weak assumptions
on the joint distribution of R and c over the male population. The analysis
can be extended more generally to cover distributions over any set of male
characteristics that influence cost, specified by parameters , withg , … , g , …1 i
and , a function of these parameters. However,g p R cp c(g , … , g , …)1 1 i
the proof is outside the scope of this article. Instead, we construct illustrative
examples of the ESS by using an iterative numerical procedure; see figures 2,
3.
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Figure 1: Illustration that the optimal ejaculate investment strategy s∗ increases with resource cost (c) but is independent of reproduction (R). The
solid lines represent the expected reproductive success per mating multiplied by the quantity of resources for two males, A and B. Both males are
competing in the same population and thus against the same population mean ejaculate investment strategy and population mean number ofs¯
matings . Male A has more resources than male B. Both males attempt to optimize their fitness, which is equal to , which amounts ton¯ Rn/(c s)
maximizing the gradients of the dashed lines. If the two males have the same cost (i.e., both have cost c1 or c2), then their optimal ejaculate investment
strategy is the same ( or ), despite having differing amounts of resources. If they have differing costs (one has cost c1 and the other cost c2),
∗ ∗s s1 2
then they will have differing optimal ejaculate investment strategies ( or , corresponding to cost c1 and c2, respectively).
∗ ∗s s1 2
∗ ¯∗ k n¯c (n ) e 1∗ ∗ ∗¯(c s ) k! s  kskp0
∗ ¯∗ k n¯(n ) e 1∗p s . (6) ∗ ∗ 2¯k! (s  ks )kp0
This final rearrangement no longer includes R, and so the
ESS ejaculate investment strategy will not depend on R
unless the cost c depends on R.
Equation (6) can be solved to obtain c as a function of
s, , and :∗ ∗¯ ¯s n
∗ ¯∗ k n ∗ 2¯ ¯ [(n ) e /k!][s/(s ks )]kp0∗ ∗¯ ¯c(sFs , n )p .∗ ¯∗ k n ∗ ∗ 2¯ ¯ ¯ [(n ) e /k!][ks /(s ks ) ]kp0
Now, for all , and c(s) is monotonically∗ ∗¯ ¯c(sFs , n ) 1 0 s ≥ 0
increasing with s (because each summand in the numer-
ator is monotonically increasing and each summand in
the denominator is monotonically decreasing). Therefore,
there is a unique inverse function , defined for∗ ∗¯ ¯s(cFs , n )
, that is also monotonically increasing. This functionc ≥ 0
is the ESS s∗.
Thus, the ESS ejaculate investment strategy s∗ is mono-
tonically increasing in c and depends on R only insofar as
c depends on R (e.g., if c is a decreasing function of R,
then s∗ will also be a decreasing function of R). Biologically,
this means that a male’s optimal ejaculate expenditure will
not vary with respect to the quantity of resources allocated
to reproduction unless the cost that males pay to obtain
a mating also varies with respect to quantity of resources.
On the other hand, as a male’s expected cost of obtaining
a mating increases, his optimal ejaculate expenditure per
mating also increases. This makes sense intuitively: males
that have to pay a higher cost in resource expenditure in
order to obtain a mating (high-c males) will value that
mating more highly and thus will invest more sperm. Such
males expect to obtain fewer matings, and therefore in this
way they exploit the small number of opportunities they
get to maximize their overall reproductive success. In con-
trast, males that have to pay a relatively low cost to obtain
a mating (low-c males) will not value each mating so highly
and will benefit by investing fewer sperm per mating. By
doing this they exploit the large number of matings they
gain, more than making up for the lower expected share
of paternity per mating.
This can be illustrated using the marginal-value theorem
(Charnov 1976). Males want to maximize their overall
fitness, which is . Since is a sum ofn(s)# R/(c s) n(s)
increasing concave functions, it is itself increasing and
concave (see app. A for further details). The optimal ejac-
ulate expenditure strategy will increase with c but will be
independent of R. In summary, the harder it is for a male
to obtain a mating, the more sperm he will invest in that
mating (fig. 1).
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Figure 2: Evolutionarily stable optimal ejaculate expenditure strategies s∗(R) (solid lines) and corresponding expected numbers of matings n∗(R)
(dashed lines) plotted against total quantity of resources allocated to reproduction (R). The position of the mean male is marked on each curve.
For each curve, R values are normally distributed (truncated between 5 and 15) across the population, with SD (j) of 1.5 and means of 7.5 (blue),
10 (red), and 12.5 (green). The cost of obtaining a mate is for all males. The functions were obtained with the numerical iterative methodcp 1
described in appendix B.
Numerical Simulations
We used an iterative method that converges on the optimal
strategy (see app. B for details) to numerically calculate
some explicit examples of evolutionarily stable ejaculate
investment strategies. For clarity of presentation, we broke
the problem down into two discrete cases, one in which
all males have the same c value but vary in R and one in
which all males have the same R value but vary in c.
Variation in R. For a fixed value of c common to all males,
we considered a distribution of R values across the male
population specified by a truncated normal distribution.
Three example ESSs are shown in figure 2. As expected,
for all three sets of parameters the evolutionarily stable
ejaculate expenditure strategy s∗ does not vary with R.
Since , it follows that the expected num-∗n(R)p R/(c s )
ber of matings for a male increases linearly with the quan-
tity of resources he allocates to mating. Thus, males with
more resources obtain more matings because they are able
to “stay the course” longer.
With all males following the same ejaculate expenditure
strategy , the fitness function (eq. [5]) becomes∗¯sp s
∗¯nR(1 e )∗ ∗ ∗¯ ¯ ¯W(R, c, s Fs , n )p ,∗ ∗¯ ¯n (c s )
and a male’s fitness is proportional to the resources he
allocates to breeding. Therefore, lower-R males can never
achieve a fitness as high as that of higher-R males.
Using this method, we also investigated how changing
the population mean quantity of resources allocated to
reproduction affects the solution to the model when theR
minimum and maximum R values are fixed (fig. 2). We
found that the optimal ejaculate expenditure for all males
increases (decreases) with increasing (decreasing) . Thus,R
although a male’s individual quantity of resources does
not affect his optimal ejaculate expenditure, the population
mean quantity of resources does. To see mathematically
why this occurs, see appendix C. Biologically, this makes
sense because if males, on average, have more resources
for mating and the cost of mating remains the same, then
they profit by investing the extra resources in ejaculate ex-
penditure.
Variation in c. For a fixed value of R common to all males,
we considered a distribution of c values across the male
population specified by a truncated normal distribution.
Three example ESSs are shown in figure 3. As expected,
for all three sets of parameters, the ESS s∗(c) is an in-
creasing function of c.
We also note that if R is fixed for all males, then a
higher-c male can never have a fitness higher than that of
a lower-c male. To see this, consider a population playing
ESS mean ejaculate expenditure strategy , with a cor-∗s¯
responding mean number of matings . Suppose we have∗n¯
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Figure 3: Evolutionarily stable optimal ejaculate expenditure strategies s∗(c) (solid lines) and corresponding expected numbers of matings n∗(c)
(dashed lines) plotted against cost of obtaining a mating (c). The position of the mean male is marked on each curve. For each curve, c values are
normally distributed across the population (truncated between 0.5 and 1.5), with SD (j) of 1/6 and means of 0.75 (blue), 1 (red), and 1.25 (green).
The quantity of resources allocated to reproduction is for all males. The functions were obtained with the numerical iterative procedureRp 10
described in appendix B.
two males, with costs of obtaining a mating c1 and c2, where
. By definition, both males will achieve their max-c ! c1 2
imum fitness only by playing the ESS strategies s∗(c1) and
s∗(c2). Thus, since expression (5) decreases as c increases
for fixed s, it follows that
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗¯ ¯ ¯ ¯W(R, c , s (c )Fs , n ) ! W(R, c , s (c )Fs , n )2 2 1 2
∗ ∗ ∗¯ ¯! W(R, c , s (c )Fs , n ),1 1
and so fitness decreases as cost c increases.
We also investigated the effects of changing the popu-
lation’s mean cost of obtaining a mate when the minimum
and maximum c values were fixed (fig. 3). As illustrated,
the ejaculate expenditure strategy for a focal male decreases
as the population mean cost increases. Thus, when malesc¯
are in a population in which, on average, they find it harder
to obtain a mate (represented by a higher mean cost ),c¯
the optimal ejaculate expenditure strategy drops. To see
why, imagine a focal male with some fixed cost of mating
c0, and consider the status of this male in two different
populations with mean cost values and , where¯ ¯ ¯c c c 11 2 1
. Our focal male, regardless of the value of c0, will bec¯2
relatively more attractive in the population, where thec¯1
average cost per mating is higher, than in the population,c¯2
where the average cost per mating is lower, and therefore
will invest fewer resources in ejaculate expenditure in the
former case than the latter. Since this is true for all values
of c0, it will be true for all males, and thus it explains why
we see the optimal ejaculate expenditure strategy decrease
as the mean cost value rises.c¯
Discussion
This study investigates how ejaculate expenditure strategies
evolve across a continuously varying phenotypic gradient
within a single population of males, under the assumptions
that sperm competition occurs as a fair raffle with no
perceptible differences among females (e.g., degree of poly-
andry, fecundity). The first general conclusion we draw is
that differences in ejaculate expenditure strategies can
evolve even within populations of males playing the same
reproductive strategy. Sperm competition theory has fo-
cused on ejaculate expenditure strategies in relation to
sperm competition risk or intensity (Parker 1998). While
these are obviously important in shaping ejaculate expen-
diture across populations, our model shows that within a
population there can be variation in optimal ejaculate ex-
penditure even when all males face the same risk and
intensity of competition in every mating.
To investigate this new theoretical framework, we con-
sidered two potential sources of continuous variation: the
cost of obtaining a mate (c) and the total resources allo-
cated to reproduction (R). Our second general conclusion
is that variation in the cost of obtaining a mating alone
is sufficient to cause differences in optimal ejaculate ex-
penditure strategy, whereas variation in resources allocated
to reproduction is not. This can be illustrated by the mar-
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ginal-value theorem (fig. 1; Charnov 1976). When a male
obtains matings more easily than his rivals, he will value
each mating less and thus will invest fewer sperm per
mating. However, when males all pay the same cost to
achieve matings, they all have the same evolutionarily sta-
ble ejaculate expenditure strategy, irrespective of the re-
sources at their disposal.
We also investigated the effects of changing the popu-
lation means of the two candidate traits (i.e., R and c) on
the optimal ejaculate expenditure strategy (figs. 2, 3). We
found that, in the case of varying mating resources R, the
optimal ejaculate expenditure increases with the amount
of resources that the population, on average, allocates to
reproduction. This is because if, on average, males have
more resources available for reproduction and pay the
same cost to obtain a mating, they invest the extra re-
sources in ejaculate expenditure (Gage and Cook 1994).
By contrast, in the case of varying mating cost c, optimal
ejaculate expenditure for a given male decreases as the
population mean cost of obtaining a mate increases. This
is because a given male with a fixed cost of obtaining a
mating will be relatively more attractive in a population
with a higher mean cost than in one with a lower mean
cost.
Our numerical modeling shows that less attractive males
(higher c) cannot achieve a fitness as high as that of more
attractive males (lower c) by changing their ejaculate ex-
penditure strategy alone, if they have the same quantity
of resources. Similarly, in the varying-resources (R) model,
at the ESS males with higher R values have more resources
to spend on mating overall and thus end up with higher
fitness, because a male’s expected fitness is proportional
to his R value (if all males have the same cost c). Thus,
in both cases, the least successful males cannot catch up
with their more successful rivals through differential ejac-
ulate expenditure alone. If they are to compete successfully,
these males will need to adopt some other tactics. In this
way, selection could favor the evolution of alternative re-
productive strategies (Shuster and Wade 2003) or other
adaptations used by males to defend their paternity, for
example, nonfertilizing sperm (Cook and Wedell 1999;
Pizzari and Foster 2008), nonsperm ejaculate compounds
such as seminal fluid peptides (Ram and Wolfner 2007),
nonspermic copulations (Løvlie et al. 2005), mate guarding
(Alcock 1994), the imposition of fitness costs associated
with mating (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995; Johnstone
and Keller 2000; Lessells 2005), and, possibly, mating plugs
(Simmons 2001; Moreira et al. 2007).
The value of the cost of obtaining a mating could arise
from female preference, with low-c males being those with
whom females prefer to mate. However, this is likely to
engender a dynamic scenario because low-c males may
impose fitness costs on their partners. First, our model
suggests that males more likely to be chosen invest less
per ejaculate. Thus, the most attractive males may not be
able to fertilize all the eggs of the females that they are
able to attract (e.g., Warner et al. 1995), generating inter-
sexual conflict over remating rates (Alonzo and Warner
1999; Pizzari and Snook 2004). Second, mating with low-
c males may also be associated with a higher risk of con-
tracting sexually transmitted diseases (Graves and Duvall
1995). Together, these mating costs generate selection for
females to avoid—rather than mate with—attractive
males. When the intensity of such selection exceeds the
direct or indirect benefits promoting female mating with
these males, female preference might cease to favor at-
tractive males. Therefore, continuously varying ejaculate
expenditure strategies within a population could have im-
portant consequences for the evolution of female pref-
erence.
In turn, female behavior may drive the evolution of
ejaculate expenditure strategies. The model investigated
here assumes that there is no relationship between a male’s
c value and the promiscuity of his mate, since all males
mate randomly with females whose promiscuity is dis-
tributed according to the Poisson distribution. In reality,
there may be some feedback in this system. Females mated
to attractive, low-c males might have a lower propensity
to mate again, compared to females mated to unattractive,
high-c males. An example of such a mechanism in socially
monogamous birds is when females paired with a poor-
quality social partner “trade up” through extra-pair cop-
ulations with males of more attractive phenotypes or more
compatible genotypes (e.g., Jennions and Petrie 2000). The
effect of this on the model would be for the optimal ejac-
ulate expenditure of low-c males to decrease yet further,
as they would be less likely to face sperm competition.
Conversely, the optimal ejaculate expenditure of high-c
males would increase, as they would be more likely to face
greater sperm competition. This change would be in line
with classical ideas about sperm competition risk (Wedell
et al. 2002; Gage and Morrow 2003). However, the rela-
tionship between female promiscuity and c value may go
in the opposite direction, for example, if females mate
more often to reduce infertility costs associated with at-
tractive males. In this case, females might be directly se-
lected to remate, and the increased risk of sperm com-
petition faced by low-c males would counterbalance the
reduced costs of obtaining mates. It would be interesting
to evaluate the relative strength of these selective forces.
Clearly, the evolution of ejaculate expenditure strategies
must be considered within a dynamic context in which
competing male mating strategies coevolve with each other
and with female responses (Moore and Pizzari 2005; Par-
ker and Ball 2005; Gavrilets and Hayashi 2006).
In addition, for simplicity our model assumes that a
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male’s ejaculate expenditure is the same for every mating
in a given breeding season. It is important to note that
this assumption has biological relevance and is consistent
with classic sperm competition theory. Constant ejaculate
expenditure tailored to the average level of sperm com-
petition in the population is expected to arise whenever
information on the level of sperm competition associated
with individual mating opportunities is unavailable to
males (Parker 1998). Even under loaded-raffle dynamics,
the ejaculate expenditure of a male is not expected to vary
across matings if males have no information on individual
mating roles and have similar probabilities of mating in
different roles at each mating (Parker 1998). However, it
is possible that differential rates of sperm depletion may,
in principle, affect ejaculate expenditure, which would ex-
pose low-c males to high remating rates and a higher risk
of sperm depletion (see above).
Finally, our numerical modeling considers the cost of
obtaining a mate and the quantity of resources allocated
to mating as distinct, uncorrelated categories of contin-
uous variation. In the real world, these two parameters
could be linked. For example, males who invest heavily in
secondary sexual ornaments and thus pay a low cost to
obtain a mate may have fewer resources available for
breeding. Under these circumstances, we would expect low
c values to correspond to low R values. On the other hand,
in some species, male attractiveness to females (and there-
fore c ; see above) may depend directly on male resource
levels (or some proxy). This would result in a coupling of
low c values with high R values. Such associations are also
to be expected when c and R values are dependent on
some other trait(s), such as a male’s quality. For example,
higher-quality males may be able to invest more in court-
ship display and/or the maintenance of a sexual ornament
or position in a social hierarchy (reducing c values) as well
as in resources for reproduction (increasing R values). All
of these possibilities can be encompassed by our analysis
if we express c as a function of other parameters, so that
, one of which could be R. Then for anycp (g , g , …)1 2
gi, if c increases (decreases) with gi, s
∗ also increases (de-
creases) with gi. Thus, any factor that makes it easier for
a male to obtain a mate would also cause selection to
decrease his optimal ejaculate expenditure.
There is some empirical evidence consistent with the
model’s predictions. For example, in domestic fowl Gallus
gallus domesticus (Froman et al. 2002; Cornwallis and Birk-
head 2007; Pizzari et al. 2007), Arctic char Salvelinus
alpinus (Rudolfsen et al. 2006), and Alpine whitefish Cor-
egonus zugensis (Rudolfsen et al. 2008), males with priv-
ileged access to females (i.e., low c) produce ejaculates of
lower fertilizing quality (controlling for number of sperm
inseminated) than do subordinate males. These findings
fit our predictions if sperm quality reflects investment.
However, care is required to establish whether reduced
ejaculate expenditure in low-c males is a strategic invest-
ment by the male or arises coincidentally through sperm
depletion due to higher remating rates. To test our ideas,
we also need to identify species in which males do not
vary greatly in the amount of effort they have to expend
in order to obtain a mating. This may plausibly apply to
externally fertilizing sessile organisms that broadcast gam-
etes or to systems where males have to expend little effort
to obtain matings because of female promiscuity. Under
these circumstances, the model predicts that all males
should invest the same amount of sperm in each mating.
More empirical work is needed before strong conclusions
can be drawn. Our theoretical work provides a framework
for considering individual variation in ejaculate expen-
diture strategies.
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APPENDIX A
Proof That Any ESS Is a Nondegenerate Maximum
Write the fitness function (eq. [5]) in the form
 ¯k n¯ ¯ ¯R n e s n(sFs, n)
¯ ¯W(R, c, sFs, n)p p R 7 , (A1)
¯c s k! s ks c skp0
where
 kn¯ s¯n¯ ¯n(sFs, n)p e .
¯k! s kskp0
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Clearly, for fixed and , n(s) is a sum of positive, increasing, and concave functions of s and hence is positive,¯ ¯s n
increasing, and concave. From equation (A1), we have
′(c s)n (s) n(s)′W (s)p R 7 ,
2(c s)
which is 0 when
n(s)′n (s)p . (A2)
c s
Equation (A2) provides the content of the marginal-value theorem illustrated in figure 1.
At any value of s for which equation (A2) holds, we have
3 ′′ ′(c s) n (s) 2(c s)[(c s)n (s) n(s)] R′′ ′′W (s)p R 7 p n (s) ! 0,
4(c s) c s
since n(s) is concave. This shows that any solution of equation (A2) is a nondegenerate maximum of W(s).
An ESS is a maximum of W(s) satisfying and and hence must be a nondegenerate maximum∗ ∗ ∗¯ ¯ ¯ ¯sp s sp s np n
of .∗ ∗¯ ¯W(R, c, sFs , n )
APPENDIX B
Details of Numerical Iterative Method
Wolfram Mathematica 6 was used to implement the following iterative numerical procedure. Here we describe the
procedure for the cost-varying case; an analogous procedure was used for the resource-varying case.
First, the initial parameter value R of resources each male has for mating is specified. We then suppose that the
distribution of c values over males is specified by a probability density function g(c), typically taken to be a truncated
normal distribution between fixed values cmin and cmax.
To begin the procedure, an initial sperm strategy function is chosen. The corresponding function n0(c) iss (c)p 10
R R
n (c)p p .0 c s (c) c 10
Next, Mathematica is used to numerically integrate (using a Gauss-Kronrod quadrature method with a global adaptive
strategy; Malcolm and Simpson 1975) over the interval [cmin, cmax] to obtain ,n¯0
cmax
R
n¯ p g(c)dc.0  c 1
cmin
The best reply function s1(c) for a male of cost c in a population with and , as above, is then the value that¯ ¯s p 1 n0 0
maximizes the fitness , as defined in equation (5), given c and the fixed R of the population. The¯ ¯W(R, c, sFs, n)
corresponding expected number of matings can then be obtained. Numerical integration is thenn (c)p R/[c s (c)]1 1
used to calculate the means and :¯ ¯s n1 1
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cmax
s¯ p s (c)g(c)dc,1  1
cmin
cmax
R
n¯ p g(c)dc.1  s (c) c1
cmin
The procedure is then iterated until solutions cease to vary by more than a specified tolerance. In our implementation,
the procedure was repeated an integer number of times i, such that . The ESS was then taken to be4¯ ¯Fs  s F ! 10i i1
si(c), with corresponding expected number of matings .n (c)p R/[c s (c)]i i
APPENDIX C
Proof That Increasing Increases ∗¯R s
Assume that the distribution of R over the male population is specified by a probability density function h(R). Consider
the equilibrium equation
 ∗ k ∗ k¯ ¯c (n ) 1 (n ) 1∗p s , (C1) ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 2¯ ¯(c s ) k! s  ks k! (s  ks )kp0 kp0
where is independent of R and∗ ∗¯s p s

RR∗n¯ p h(R)dRp . (C2) ∗ ∗¯c s (R) c s
0
To simplify notation, write and . Then, equations (C1) and (C2) give two equilibrium equations:∗ ∗ ∗¯ ¯ ¯ ¯s p s p s n p n
 k k¯ ¯n n 1
s¯ p c 1 , (C3)  ( )(k 1)(k 1)! (k 1)! k 1kp0 kp0
¯ ¯Rp n(c s). (C4)
Note that equation (C3) defines as a function of , and hence equation (C4) defines as a function of . Multiplying¯ ¯ ¯s n R n
equation (C3) through by , we can writen¯
 k1¯ n /(k 1)!kp0
s¯p c  1 . (C5) k1[ ]¯ n /(k 1)(k 1)!kp0
The expression in the numerator, , in equation (C5) is¯N(n)
n¯¯N(n)p e  1, (C6)
and the expression in the denominator, , can be written as¯D(n)
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n¯

1 1
k1 u¯ ¯D(n)p n p (e  1)du. (C7) (k 1)(k 1)! ukp0
0
Thus, from equations (C5)–(C7) we obtain as a function of :¯ ¯s n
n¯¯N(n) e  1
¯ ¯s(n)p c  1 p c  1 . (C8)n¯ u[ ] [ ]¯D(n) (1/u)(e  1)du∫0
We show below that is monotonically increasing in . Note that as (by L’Hoˆpital’s rule),¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯s(n) n N(n)/D(n) r 1 n r 0
and hence .s¯(0)p 0
It follows from equation (C4) that, if is a monotonically increasing function of , then so is . Thus,¯ ¯ ¯ ¯s(n) n R(n)
is positive. This gives the required result that increases as increases.¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ds/dRp (ds/dn)/(dR/dn) s R
It remains to show that is a monotonically increasing function of . From equation (C8), we are required to¯ ¯ ¯s(n) n
show that is increasing. Since and are both nonnegative, this is the case if¯ ¯ ¯ ¯N(n)/D(n) N(n) D(n)
′ ′¯ ¯N (n) D (n)≥ ,
¯ ¯N(n) D(n)
with equality only if . That is, using equations (C6) and (C7),n¯p 0
1 ¯ ¯n n¯D(n) ≥ (e  e  1), (C9)
n¯
with equality only if .n¯p 0
To verify equation (C9), consider the function . Then, , and¯ ¯n n¯ ¯ ¯F(n)p D(n) (1/n)(e  e  2) F(0)p 0
1 1 1¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯′ n n n n n¯F (n)p (e  1) (e  e ) (e  e  2)
2¯ ¯ ¯n n n
1 ¯ ¯n n ¯p (1 e )[e  (1 n)]
2n¯
≥ 0,
with equality only when . Thus, is monotonically increasing for , which proves equation (C9) and¯ ¯ ¯np 0 F(n) n 1 0
hence gives the required result.
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